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Restoring Accountability at the Municipal
Level: The "Save Miami Beach"
Zoning Referendum
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the southern tip of the island of Miami Beach, Florida, a 44story, 228 apartment building known as Portofino Tower shoots upward
toward the endless blue sky. While this $52.7 million testimony to modem engineering resides peacefully among other neon and pastel Art
Deco style buildings, it has become the epi-center of a bitter
controversy.
To some, Portofino Tower symbolizes the revitalization of a once
blighted section of Miami Beach. The high-rise represents growth and
prosperity and is the crown jewel of Miami Beach's renaissance.' To
others, Portofino is a case study of how political mismanagement and
the power of a well-funded lobby can destroy the aesthetic harmony of a
subtropical paradise.
The construction of Portofino Tower underscored a growing concem among the citizens of Miami Beach about the weaknesses of their
representative government. The approval of the building of Portofino
Tower revealed to many residents their inability to communicate effectively with their elected officials and to participate in the future development of their city. To repair the lines of communication with their
elected officials and to restore the sense of empowerment by direct participation in the decision-making process,2 the citizens of Miami Beach
amended their city charter to require a referendum vote, rather than a
city commission vote, to approve the rezoning of any waterfront
property.3
This article explores the validity for the citizens of Miami Beach of
using the referendum procedure to approve or reject rezoning requests.
Part II discusses the history of the referendum as a source of citizen
participation in the exercise of legislative power and how the referendum process arose in the saga known as the "Save Miami Beach" zoning
1. See generally Mark Kurlansky, Miami Beach on Road Back to Lost Grandeur, CH. TRIB.,

Oct. 19, 1986, at 18 (discussing Miami Beach's "renaissance" in the later 1980s).
2. See generally JOHN T. ROURKE ET AL., DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: DECIDING INTERNATIONAL IssuEs THROUGH REFERENDUMS 15 (1992) (discussing how

widespread use of referendums would increase a citizen's opportunity to participate in
government).
3. See MIAMI BEACH, FLA., REs. 97-22413 (June 4, 1997).
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referendum. Part III discusses the constitutionality of the referendum
procedure, both generally and with respect to zoning, based on federal
constitutional grounds. Part IV focuses on whether subjecting rezoning
requests to voter approval is a valid exercise of the referendum power in
Florida and in Miami Beach. Part V concludes with a final analysis of
why the "Save Miami Beach" zoning referendum is a disturbing example of how federal and state case law may prevent communities from
empowering themselves through the referendum process with regard to
land use decisions.
II.

A

A.

The Rise of the Referendum

LITTLE HISTORY LESSON

Since the beginning of the American republic in 1789, Americans
have progressed steadfastly toward a more perfect democracy. No concept has embodied this progression nor had a more "profound influence
upon the political thought of America" than the town meeting.4 The
town meeting, a type of direct legislation "expressing the 'will of the
people' has had a certain legitimacy in America since the 1640s, when
all or most of the freemen in New England villages assembled to make
the laws by which they would be regulated."'5 The sense of empowerment stemming from direct communication with elected officials and
direct participation in the decision-making process "bred a self-confidence and a civic culture that generally whetted the appetite for more."6
As the United States entered the nineteenth century, the growth of
large cities revealed the town meeting as an unsuitable "mode of government." 7 The town meeting was a distinctively rural institution. 8 With
the growing predominance of urban and national problems, the issues
involved in running the government "were of an extent too vast and the
population was too widely dispersed" to make the town meeting and its
4. DELOS F. Witcox, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE, THE INITIATIVE, THE REFERENDUM,
AND THE RECALL AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 5 (1912). The concept of the town meeting,
which had been around since the days of Athens, "attracted the attention and excited the

admiration of statesmen and publicists." Id. The Framers captured the essence of the town
meeting by including in the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law... abridging...

the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. While it may be true that the Founding Fathers "did not give
pure democracy a serious thought as a mode of government in the nation or in the separate states"
since the "areas involved were of an extent too vast and the population was too widely dispersed,"
the Founding Fathers did intend to preserve some power to the people. WILCox, supra.
5. THOMAS

E.

CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,

AND RECALL 41 (1989).
6. Id.at 12.
7. WILcox, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Id.
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direct legislation component a viable option. 9 Regardless of the social
or political phenomenon that led to the decline of the town meeting,
Americans reconciled its diminishing importance as an acceptable side
effect of growth and prosperity.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, machine politics
and business domination of government left Americans feeling disenchanted with the political system. Americans "were increasingly convinced that powerful, organized, self-seeking interests shaped legislative
outcomes at the expense of the public interest."'" Feeding off this bitter-

ness, reform-minded Progressives garnered support by campaigning "to
open up the system of government and restore more power to the people."' 1 Progressives believed that unless "the machine and its bosses
could be broken, unless the corrupt alliance between greedy corporate
interests and the machines could be smashed, it seemed that no lasting
improvement could be achieved."' 2 To achieve lasting improvement,
the Progressives favored the implementation of "direct democracy
devices," which would "neutraliz[e] the power of flagrant special interests."13 The remedy for the evils of democracy was, simply, more
democracy.
Searching for political devices to accomplish their reforms, the
Progressives sought to implement mechanisms associated with direct
legislation where the people, "rather than the government, [were] the

9. Id.
10. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 54. Cronin accurately points out that Muckrakers, such as
Lincoln Steffens, Frank Norris, Gustavus Myers, Ida Tarbell, Ray Stannard Baker, and Upton
Sinclair, shifted American attitudes by bringing to light the fact that businesses and party bosses,
such as the Tweed Ring, controlled government. Id. at 55. Another expression of this hostility
was the popularity of the term "robber baron" to describe the leaders of industry such as Andrew
Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew W. Mellon, and Henry Ford, who had incredible wealth,
even by today's standards, and could influence people with their purse strings. See generally
MARY BETH NORTON ET AL., A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 311
(1991). Arguably, most of these men became philanthropic because of the bad publicity they
received during the Progressive Era.
11. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 56.
12. Id. at 56.
13. Id. at 56. The Populist Party had a brief existence. Created in 1891, the party disappeared
after their candidate, William Jennings Bryan, lost the 1896 presidential election. See NORTON,
supra note 10, at 356-57. The Populist Party believed that Eastern industrialists and bankers
controlled both the Democratic and Republican parties. See id. at 345. They sought to reform the
election system by the direct election of Senators and the use of a graduated income tax system.
See id. The Progressive Movement was the successor to the Populist Party. See id. at 372.
Lasting from 1901 until 1921, Progressives sought a broad base of reforms similar to and
exceeding those sought by the Populists only a decade before. See id. Ultimately, the
Progressives nominated Theodore Roosevelt as their candidate, under the "Bull Moose" ticket, in
an unsuccessful effort to win the U.S. Presidential election of 1912. See id. at 372.
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organism."' 14 The town meeting was an example of "actual self-govern-

ment" that could bring lasting change to American politics.' 5 However,
the Progressives realized that "the town meeting . . . proved to work

admirably" 6 when "communities were themselves simple and homogeneous." 17 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the people "from
one end of the country to the other, [were] not homogeneous but composite, their interests varied and extended, their life complex and intricate." 1 8 The diversity within American society made "town meetings
• . . out of the question.

' 9

Reformists understood that they needed a

political device that had the same principles inherent in the town meeting, one that encouraged direct communication and contribution to the
decision-making process while at the same time making elected officials
accountable to voters and not to special interests. The referendum
would prove to be the perfect solution.
The referendum represented the next stage of development of the
town meeting. 20 The referendum procedure could function regardless of
geographical size and societal composition. More importantly, the referendum procedure retained all of the pure democracy and direct legislation elements found in the town meeting. For example, by addressing
"issues rather than personalities," the referendum could provide greater
objectivity, which would lead to "greater accuracy in expressing the
public will."'2' Furthermore, the referendum could "effectively check[ ]
the corruption of legislatures by ...

special interest groups" since the

"people [could] effectuate their will on a specific issue."22 Finally, the
exercise of a referendum could restore "voter involvement" and "public
debate" that the New England town meeting once nurtured in
abundance.23
With the Progressive movement gaining strength, the referendum
quickly increased in popularity. While not entirely new to American
14. Governor Woodrow Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE REFERENDUM AND
RECALL 72 (William Bennett Munro ed., 1916).
15. Id.
16. Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Nationalism and Popular Rule, in THE INITIATIVE
REFERENDUM AND RECALL 63 (William Bennett Munro ed., 1916).
17. Wilson, supra note 15, at 72.

18. Id. at 72-73.
19. Id.at 73.
20. See Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 63.
21. Gilbert Hahn, III & Stephen C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum-Do They Encourage
or Impair Better State Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 925, 938 (1977); see also William
Bennett Munro, Introduction, in THE INITIATIVE REFERENDUM AND RECALL 22 (William Bennett

Munro ed., 1916).
22. Hahn & Morton, supra note 21, at 939.
23. Id. at 939-40.
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politics,24 the referendum grew in popularity "due to the failure of the
representative bodies really to represent the people," as well as "the
inevitable consequence of the gross betrayal of [the people's] trust by
various representatives." 2 5 In 1898, South Dakota became the first state
to-adopt the referendum. 26 By the end of the Progressive Era in 1921,
twenty-one additional states followed South Dakota in amending their
state constitutions to grant voters the use of the referendum.
B.

The "Save Miami Beach" Saga, a Parallel Story

With the dawning of the jet-age in the 1950s, Miami Beach became
a sub-tropical paradise to Americans and Europeans.2 8 Cheaper airfare
and quicker travel time made Miami Beach a favorite to those wanting
to escape the cold winters. 29 To accommodate all of the tourists that
arrived each winter for warm sunny days and sandy beaches, new hotels
and high-rises developed almost overnight.3" Hotels such as the
Fountainebleau and the Eden Roc quickly reached legendary status as
winter homes to rich and famous individuals such as Frank Sinatra,
Jackie Gleason, Desi Arnez, Myer Lansky, and Elizabeth Taylor.3" By
the 1970s and early 1980s, however, the real estate and tourist industries
collapsed,3 2 and a drastic rise in drug trafficking and violent crime decisively ended Miami Beach's reign as a tourist and celebrity destination.
By the late 1980s, there was a renewed interest in South Miami
Beach.3 3 Fashion photographers began to use the warm sunny climate
and the "backdrop of the Art Deco buildings on South Beach to produce
trend setting magazine spreads. '34 With photographs of models and
celebrities set against the Art Deco landscape constantly gracing the
covers of national and international magazines, South Beach became a
24. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 12.
25. Munro, supra note 21, at 62.
26. See id. at 51.
27. See id. The states that followed South Dakota were Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Nevada
(1904), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Maine (1908), Missouri (1908), Arkansas (1910),
Colorado (1910), Arizona (1911), California (1911), New Mexico (1911), Idaho (1912), Nebraska
(1912), Ohio (1912), Washington (1912), Michigan (1913), North Dakota (1914), Kentucky
(1915), Maryland (1915), and Massachusetts (1918). See id. As of 1992, initiatives and
referendums may decide statutory as well as constitutional proposals in about seventy-five percent
of the states. See ROURKE, supra note 2, at 42.
28. See Michael Warren, Art Deco Ladies Brighten Miami Beach, CHI. TRlB., Feb. 18, 1990,

at 2K.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See

Kurlansky, supra note 1, at 18.
id.
Susan Kelleher, Miami Renaissance, PATRIOT LEDGER, Mar. 7, 1998, at 39.
Barbara DeLollis, Reaching Condo Capacity, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 1997, at IF.

33. See id.
34. Kelleher, supra note 31, at 39.
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worldwide destination.35
The renewed interest in Miami Beach led the city to once again
become the focus of developers. With land values being so low, developers saw the waterfront as a potential gold mine. However, during the
twenty years when Miami Beach fell in disfavor with developers and
tourist dollars, the residents' attitude toward development on the island
changed. The "[c]ycles of boom-and-bust speculation left South Florida
a patchwork of opulence contrasted with decay. ' 36 The effects of the
condominium glut of the 1970s, which resulted in the collapse of the
real estate market in South Florida, left many residents with a bitter feeling toward development.37 More importantly, residents feared that new
high-rises would create a concrete canyon along the waterfront impairing pristine views of the ocean while at the same time dampening the
historic beauty of the low-rise art deco landscape.
Nevertheless, in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, high-rise
development projects received approval in growing numbers. As the
number and size of the projects multiplied, the hostility of the citizens
toward their elected officials grew.3 8 When the city of Miami Beach
finalized a land swap deal so that developer Thomas Kramer and his
Portofino Group could build at least five new skyscrapers on the tip of
South Beach, the citizens of Miami Beach acted. 39 Miami Beach residents felt that "they [were not] represented well . . . in City Hall."4
Like the reform-minded Progressives, they experienced similar disenchantment with the political system and feared the same inability to
hold their elected officials accountable to the voters, rather than to special interests.4" Many residents felt the need to implement a political
device that would encourage direct communication and voter contribution to the decision-making process, while increasing the accountability
of their elected officials.4"
In November of 1996, a group calling itself "Save Miami Beach"
began to collect the signatures of ten percent of the city's 39,548 regis35. See id.
36. Michael Barnes, SoFlo, So Sophisticated, Ausm AMERICAN-STATESMAN, 1996, at G1.
37. See DeLollis, supra note 32.
38. For example, one month after passage of the Miami Beach zoning referendum in July of
1997, developers proposed eight major high-rise projects in the City of Miami Beach. See Rick
Jervis & Peter Whoriskey, Anti-development Mood Sweeps Beach, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 5, 1997,
at Bl.
39. See Martin Wisckol, Miami Beach Voters OK Limits on Building, HOLLYWOOD-FT.
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, June 4, 1997, at 5B.
40. Id.
41. See generally Connie Prater, Beach Zoning Measure May Fall Short, MIAMI HERALD,
June 1, 1997, at lB.
42. See id.
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tered voters in order to take the first step toward placing an amendment
to the city charter on the next ballot. 43 Rather than requiring developers
to seek the approval of the Miami Beach City Commission when
requesting a zoning increase, the amendment would require "developers
to seek voters' approval in order to change the amount of allowable
development on waterfront properties."'
In the weeks preceding the citywide vote, the referendum issue
"spawned a brawling campaign marked by a blitz of television and radio
45
ads that have become almost as controversial as the zoning vote itself.
Raising less than $15,000 and "outspent nearly 100 to 1," the "Save
Miami Beach" campaign won the approval of fifty-seven percent of the
voters by "striking a chord with residents fed up with congestion and the
surge of new skyscrapers tentatively approved for South Beach."' With
voter approval of the zoning referendum, the stage has been set for a
battle between developers who believe in land use and the citizens of
Miami Beach who decry what they perceive to be land abuse. Although
most of the land along the waterfront of Miami Beach has been developed, a great deal of land and money remain at stake.4 7 Older properties
built under more restrictive zoning laws, in addition to undeveloped
properties, could become targets of developers seeking the potential
financial windfall a new high-rise luxury condominium would provide. 8
Because a substantial amount of undeveloped property and older
property ripe for redevelopment sit along the Miami Beach waterfront,
the Miami Beach zoning referendum has the potential to make or break
the future development of the City of Miami Beach. To some, the referendum will curb a surge that has "turned into a stampede in which bigmoney developers are running roughshod over city officials and residents alike, bringing too much growth too fast."' 4 9 The consequences of
43. See Kirk Semple, Arrested Development, MIAVn NEw TIvES, Jan. 16, 1997. Petitions
proposing amendments to the Miami Beach Charter require the "signatures of ten percent or more
of the qualified electors of [the] city." MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CHRtTER § 51 (1964).
44. Semple, supra note 43. What the voters approved and what is the subject of this article is

the following: "Shall the City of Miami Beach Charter be amended to include a requirement for
public vote prior to any increase in floor area ratio of property adjacent to the waterfront, which
requirement shall be in effect from January 31, 1997?" MIAMu BEACH, FLA., RES. 97-22413 (June
4, 1997).
45. Mike Williams, Miami Beach at Odds Over Zoning Blitz, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 30,

1997, at 6B.
46. Wisckol, supra note 39.
47. See Semple, supra note 43. With "almost 99 percent of the land developed . . .
reinvestment in the same land use is the pattern." MItI BEACH, FLA., YEAR 2000
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, PART I: DATA AND ANALYSIS

1-2 (1996).

48. See Patricia Leigh Brown, A Broken Home, Cm. TRm., July 23, 1989, at 15. In 1989, 200
of the 800 registered Art Deco low-rise buildings were recently restored or newly painted.
49. Williams, supra note 45.
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slow or no growth at all would be better than unchecked or unbridled
growth. To others, the referendum would stem "the tidal wave of redevelopment that [has brought] luxury high-rise buildings and upscale
buyers to the city." 5 Allowing the citizens to approve rezoning issues
most likely would stop any development, cause a loss of jobs, and
decrease a tax base desperately in need of new revenue.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REFERENDUM

A.

Referendum Defined

A referendum enables voters "to have an act passed by the legislative body submitted for their approval or rejection."5 A referendum has
the "power to stop things, but not to make them go. It is an instrument
of negation."52 With regard to the issue of this article, the Miami Beach
zoning referendum could be more accurately classified as a mandatory
referendum. A mandatory referendum "obligates the legislative body to
seek voter approval prior to specified measures becoming effective."53
If a property owner wants the city commission to rezone the owner's
waterfront property, the commission must seek voter approval before the
rezoning can become effective.54
B.

Referendums: Constitutionalor Unconstitutional?

The inherent purpose of the referendum as a political device
enabling greater democracy seems, on its face, ideal. Referendums
would foster greater citizen participation in government by generating
public debate. This increased participation would lead to a better-educated electorate. Moreover, referendums would effectively check the
influence that minority special interest groups have over elected officials. All of these factors would result in a more perfect democracy.
While the goals of the referendum appear heroic, a closer analysis
raises many concerns. Is the whole of society best served "by the
expressions of an amorphous popular will" on complex issues and with
50. Id.
51. 5 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.53 (3d ed. rev.
1996). Munro provides a more detailed definition, yet it expresses the same concept that a
referendum is "the right of a stated percentage of voters to demand that measures passed by the
ordinary lawmaking bodies of the state or municipality shall be submitted to the whole body of
voters for acceptance or rejection." Munro, supra note 21, at 1.

52. Wucox, supra note 4, at 131.
53. Michael S. Davis & Mirella Murphy Jones, A Participatory Democracy with Archaic

Rules: Initiative, Referendum, and Recall at the Municipal Level, 22 STETSON L. REV. 715, 716
(1993).
54. See MIAMI BEACH, FLA., Res. 97-22413 (June 4, 1997).
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numerous measures placed on a ballot?55 Will this type of direct legislation render "intelligent decision making by the voters" a reality? 6

Will direct legislation by way of referendum necessarily stop special
interest groups from "oiling" the direct legislation machinery to 57get the
desired results just as they did under the representative system? Will
58
the quality of legislators remain the same?
The concerns surrounding the exercise of the referendum process
are secondary. Vesting power in the people, which would allow citizens
to supersede the legislators' right to approve or reject legislation, raises
the ultimate question: Is it constitutional to allow the electorate to make

governmental decisions through direct legislation devices such as the
referendum?
1.

UNCHALLENGED AND UNQUESTIONED DURING THE BIRTH OF
THE REPUBLIC

In the early years of the republic, no one questioned the use of
referendums. Many states used the referendum to ratify the federal constitution and their own state constitutions. 9 Notwithstanding, most
Revolutionary leaders and thinkers were "profoundly skeptical of direct
or pure democracy on a large scale. They had read about the rise and
decline of Athens and other ancient city-states that preached and practiced early versions of democracy."60 The general feeling among many
of the Founding Fathers was that they fought "not to establish a democracy but to establish a republic."6 1 Ultimately, many of the Framers
believed that "public opinion, properly harnessed, would serve, at least
in normal times, as one of the prime guides for government lawmaking
and leadership."6 2 Public opinion would steer lawmaking but not com55. Hahn & Morton,'supranote 21, at 940; cf. Cronin, supra note 5, at 208-09 (discussing the
general problems with direct legislation procedures).
56. HAHN & MORTON, supra note 21, at 941; see also CRONIN, supra note 5, at 61
(questioning voter competence).
57. Wilson, supra note 15, at 69-70; see also, Cronin, supra note 5, at 99.
58. See Munro, supra note 21, at 25. Wide spread use of direct legislative methods, such as
the referendum, might lead to a decrease in the quality of legislators commensurate with the
decline in the responsibility home by the legislature. See CRONIE, supra note 5, at 211.
59. See Munro, supra note 21, at 5.
60. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 13. Many revolutionary leaders were like John Adams who,
while "pleased that his own Massachusetts submitted its 1780 constitution for popular debate and
consideration at the open town meetings throughout the commonwealth," believed that the
"frailties and passions of ordinary men made them incapable of responsible participation in
government. The power should be delegated from the many to the prudent and virtuous few." Id.
61. Id.at 12.
62. Id.at 18. James Madison "extolled the virtues of representative government and decried
the dangers of mobocracy and factionalism inherent in popular democracy." David James Jordan,
ConstitutionalConstraintson Initiativeand Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1143 (1979) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST

No. 10 (J. Madison)).
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mand lawmaking. Although the Founding Fathers disapproved of the
referendum process, the question of its use remained unchallenged for
nearly eighty years.
2.

JUDICIAL REVIEW DECLINED BUT DISCUSSED APPROVINGLY
IN DICTA

With the rise of the Populist and Progressive movements in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to address the constitutionality of the referendum process. Rather
than take up the issue, the Court initially found alternate grounds to dismiss each challenge and ultimately evaded the issue by relegating any
attack on the referendum issue to the more generalized constraints of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In 1875, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the validity of
the retrocession of part of the District of Columbia by Congress to the
State of Virginia.63 While the Court evaded the ultimate question of
whether a citizen voting on legislative matters by referendum was constitutional,' the majority's opinion did provide some insight into its
feelings on the referendum issue.
In addressing the referendum issue, the Court stated that if the
plaintiff in error's contentions "were maintained in the length and
breadth insisted upon, serious consequences would follow. '65 The
majority outlined a list of potential horrors that would result if the Court
supported the plaintiff's contentions because every state law "passed
since the retrocession, [regarding] the county of Alexandria, [would be]
void."' 66 More importantly, the Court stated that a decision in favor of
63. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130 (1875).

64. In 1846, Congress "passed an act ... [authorizing] a vote to be taken by the people of
Alexandria County to determine whether the county should be retroceded to the State of Virginia."

Phillips, 92 U.S. at 131. In 1789, "Virginia... ceded to the United States that part of her territory
...

which Congress set apart as the seat of the government of the United States, and organized as

the District of Columbia." Id. The majority of the voters of Alexandria County chose to rejoin
Virginia. More than two decades after the retrocession by referendum, a resident of Alexandria
County brought an action against the Alexandria County tax collector claiming that "the act of

Congress of 1846.... [and] everything done under it," as well as "the law of Virginia reannexing
the county to the State and extending her jurisdiction over it, [were] contrary to the Constitution of
the United States, and illegal and void." Id. at 133. The Court held that "Virginia [was] de facto

in possession of the territory in question. [The State had] been in possession, and ... title and
possession [had] been undisputed, since [Virginia] resumed possession in 1847." Id. at 133. The
Court found it particularly relevant that since the vote nearly thirty years ago, "no murmur of

discontent [had] been heard." Id. Based on this silence, the Court felt that the "plaintiff in error
[was] estopped from raising the point" that the state and federal government's actions were illegal
and void. Id. at 134.
65. 92 U.S. at 133.
66. The Court listed the potential offspring of a contrary decision:
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the plaintiff in error's contention would have far-reaching national
implications.67 The potential list of horrors feared by the Court in the
Phillips case would come to pass in almost every state and at the federal
level because nearly every state used the referendum procedure to
approve the federal constitution as well as their own state
constitutions.68
While listing a parade of horrors is not a resounding legal endorsement, the Court did provide more sound legal reasoning for approving of
the referendum process. In discussing on the right to waive constitutional provisions, the majority stated that it "[did] not [need to] invoke
[to] their aid"69 other arguments such as the fact that "under certain circumstances, a constitutional provision may . ..be waived by a party

entitled to insist upon it."' 70 In Phillips, the plaintiff in error challenged
the action taken by Congress in 1846 to annex or retrocede a portion of
Alexandria County. Congress authorized the retrocession based on its
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 7 1 Because Congress had the
power to annex land necessary to form the capital, it would seem logical
that Congress had an implied power to retrocede annexed land that they
deemed superfluous. Therefore, because Congress had the power to retrocede annexed land, Congress was a "party entitled" to waive a right
reserved to them in a constitutional provision.72
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Progressives' call for
greater use of direct democracy methods in government led to a wave of
states amending their state constitutions so as to authorize the use of the
referendum.7 3 In the early 1900s, the Court again had a chance to
address the constitutionality of the referendum process,

74

but, like in

Taxes [would] have been illegally assessed and collected; the election of public

officers, and the payment of their salaries, [would have been] without warrant of
law; public accounts [would] have been improperly settled; all sentences,
judgments, and decrees of the courts [would have been] nullities, and those who

carried them into execution [would have been] liable civilly, and perhaps criminally,
according to the nature of what they [had] severally done. Phillips, 92 U.S. at 133.
67. See id.
68. See Munro, supra note 21, at 15.
69. Phillips, 92 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added).

70. Id. at 132.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17. "The Congress shall have Power . . .To exercise
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may,
by Cession of particular States and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States."
72. This statement also could imply that if the people of a state reserve the right to approve or
reject legislation, they may do so since they are a "party entitled to insist upon it." Phillips, 92
U.S. at 132.
73. See discussion infra Part I.A.

74. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). In this case, the
Supreme Court considered a Guaranty Clause challenge to a tax statute enacted pursuant to a
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Phillips, the Court avoided ruling directly on the constitutionality of the
referendum procedure by finding other grounds to dismiss the case.7 5
Because the majority refused to pass upon the constitutionality of direct
legislation methods, whether it be an initiative or referendum, the decision in Pacific relegated any attack on the use of the referendum to the
more generalized constraints of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment for the next half century.7 6

3.

REASSESSMENT REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW AND VALIDATION OF
THE REFERENDUM PROCESS

Interest in the referendum diminished with the Progressive movement's decline in 1921. For the next forty years, no new states added

the procedure. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a
renewed interest in the exercise of direct legislation methods such as the
referendum.7 7 This rise in popularity was due largely to the fact that
citizens wanted to employ direct legislation methods as a form of
expression and protest.7 8 It was during this period that the Supreme

Court, through a series of opinions, reassessed its role regarding judicial
review of referendum-generated state law.7 9
In Reitman v. Mulkey,8 ° the Court was asked to decide the constitu-

tionality of California's Proposition 14.81 The majority rejected Propoprovision of the*Oregon constitution reserving the initiative and referendum power to the people.
Id. at 133. The appellant argued that the direct legislative process used in Oregon to approve a tax
statute resulted in the state's rejection of a republican form of government, which the Article IV,
§ 4 of the Federal Constitution guaranteed to every State in the Union. Id. at 120-21.
75. In this case, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the challenge made by
appellant involved a political question, which was an issue committed exclusively to Congress.
Id. at 151. While Pacific dealt with the determination of whether a state law 'enacted by an
initiative was in fact constitutional, the Court, later that year, "again upheld the political question
designation and also extended the non-justiciability criterion to local referendums." Keirnan v.
City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151, 164 (1912).
76. See Jordan, supra note 62, at 1149.
77. See ROURKE, supra note 2, at 42. In 1968 alone, there were 16,000 local referendums.
See id.
78. See id.. During the Vietnam War' era, there were votes on the issue of continued U.S.
participation in the Vietnam War. See id.
79. See ROURKE, supra note 2, at 153. These cases were Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 136 (1971), and
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). While not important to the
discussion, two cases in 1982."cemented the Court's right to review laws and state constitutional
amendments promulgated through referendum votes." See ROURKE, supra note 2, at 154. These
cases were Crawford v. Board of Educ., 102 U.S. 3211 (1982), and Washington v. Seattle, 102
U.S. 3187 (1982).
80. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
81. Proposition 14, a measure submitted to statewide ballot for voter approval, prevented the
state of California or any agency thereof from denying, limiting, or abridging, directly or
indirectly "the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of
his real property, to decline or sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in
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sition 14 because the state constitutional amendment significantly
encouraged and involved "the State in private racial discriminations to

an unconstitutional degree."" z While the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate Proposition
14 as it had in past decisions, Reitman marked a reversal in policy. The
Court no longer invoked the political question designation with regard to
actions challenging direct legislation methods.
Two years later, the Court examined the constitutionality of an
amendment to a city charter that was approved by referendum.83 While
striking down the charter amendment as a violation of the Equal Protec-

tion Clause, the majority found that because, under constitutional
assumptions, all power derives from the people, the people may retain
for themselves the power to deal directly with matters which might
otherwise be assigned to the legislature.84
Two years after Hunter, the Supreme Court continued to move

closer to fully analyzing the constitutionality of the referendum.85 In
James, the Court pointed out that referendum provisions "demonstrate

devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice" by giving citizens "a voice on questions of public policy.

'86

The referendum

process "ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in
a decision. 87 Such a mechanism "gives [citizens] a voice in decisions
that will affect the future development of their own community. 88
Finally, in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,89 the
Court resoundingly validated the constitutionality of the referendum prohis absolute discretion, chooses." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967) (quoting
Proposition 14).
82. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381.
83. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In Hunter, the citizens of Akron approved
by referendum an amendment to the city charter that required any transfer or use of property on
the "basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry ... be approved by [a] majority of
voters." Id. Because the charter amendment "constitute[d] a real, substantial, and invidious
denial of the equal protection of the laws" that unfairly burdened racial minorities, the majority
found the charter amendment invalid. Id. at 393.
84. See id. at 392.
85. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Citizens of Akron approved an amendment
to the city charter, which prevented the development, construction, or purchase, in any manner by
a state public body, of low-rent housing until the project received approval by a majority of those
voting in a community election. See id. In essence, the ordinance "required a referendum to
approve de facto economic segregation through low-income housing projections." ROURKE, supra
note 2, at 154. Although this ordinance served the same purpose as the ordinances in Hunter and
Reitman, the Court allowed the zoning ordinance to stand since it turned on economic rather than
racial distinctions. See id. at 154.
86. 402 U.S. at 141.
87. Id. at 143.
88. Id.
89. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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cess. Chief Justice Warren Burger, on behalf of the majority, "defended
the power of the people to legislate via referendum as a basic democratic
right."9 In "establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to
themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise
be assigned to the legislature,"'" because, under "our constitutional
assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to
representative instruments which they create." 9 2

The majority further held that the reservation of power by the people "is the basis for the town meeting, a tradition which continues to this
day in some states as both a practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes." 93 Like the town meeting, the referendum "is a means

for direct political participation, allowing the people the final decision,
amounting to a veto power, over enactments of representative bodies."94
4.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ZONING REFERENDUM

In addition to validating the exercise of the referendum process
generally, the Eastlake majority also validated the use of the referendum
process on zoning matters. At the heart of the opinion was whether a
city charter provision requiring fifty-five percent of the voters to
approve proposed land use changes violated the due process rights of a
landowner who applied for a zoning change.95 The Court found that the
city's charter provision did not violate the landowner's due process
rights since the exercise of the referendum provision was properly
reserved in the state constitution.96
C. How to Properly Reserve and Exercise a Zoning Referendum
While the Supreme Court has advocated the referendum as a "basic
instrument of democratic government," the Court's endorsement does
not suggest that the referendum power is always an option for citizens in
every state, county, or municipality.97 In order to determine whether the
referendum mechanism is a viable option for citizens, it is necessary to
examine fully the Eastlake case.
In 1971, the respondent applied to the City Planning Commission
90. ROURKE, supra note 2, at 155.
91. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)).
92. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).

93. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672-73.
94. Id. By comparing the referendum to the town meeting, the Chief Justice's statement
bestowed an extra measure of legitimacy to the constitutionality of the referendum because of the
special place that the town meeting has in the "national memory." WILcox, supra note 4, at 5.
95. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 670.
96. Id. at 679.
97. Id.
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for a zoning change to permit construction of a multifamily, high-rise
apartment building on an eight-acre parcel of real estate zoned for "light
industrial" use. 98 However, the city charter provided that any changes in
land use agreed to by the City Planning Commission had to be approved
in a referendum vote. 99 The respondent asserted that this city charter
provision violated his due process rights. 1"
For a referendum to satisfy federal constitutional requirements, the
Court established a two-prong test. First, the people had to reserve to
themselves the power to approve or reject rezoning issues. 10 1 Second,
the subject matter of the referendum had to deal directly with matters
that might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.102
1.

RESERVATION IN STATE CONSTITUTION

As already discussed, the Supreme Court of the United States presumed, according to constitutional interpretation, that all power derives
from the people.1"3 In establishing legislative bodies, the people delegated their inherent power-that is, surrendered their power to make
decisions.' °4 To approve or reject legislative measures, "the people
must reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which
might otherwise be assigned to the legislature." ' What the people gave
away in initially creating their legislative body, they must take back.
Thus, not only must the citizens of a county or municipality reserve the
referendum in their governing body's charter, but to meet federal due
process requirements, there must be a reservation of the referendum procedure in the state constitution.
To determine if the people reserved any power to approve or reject
legislation, the Court in Eastlake examined the Ohio Constitution. The
Court concluded that "the people of Ohio specifically reserved the
power of referendum to the people of each municipality within the
State."1 06
98. Id. at 670.
99. See id.

100. See id. at 671.
101. See id. at 672-73.
102. See id. at 673.
103. Id. at 672.

104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 673. "The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of
each municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized
by law to control by legislative action." OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(f). In addition, the "legislative

power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly... but the people reserve to themselves
the power to propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to

adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote." Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672 n.5 (quoting
OHo Co sT. art. II, § 1).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:541

The Supreme Court undertook the same analysis in another zoning
referendum case only a few years earlier. In upholding the constitutionality of a restrictive zoning ordinance that prevented the development,
construction, or acquisition of low-rent housing "until the project was
approved by a majority of those voting at a community election," the
Court, in James v. Valtierra, began its analysis by addressing whether
the citizens of San Jose and San Mateo County had reserved the right to
use the referendum procedure. 10 7 The Court stated that "the California

Constitution [Article IV, § 1] had for many years reserved to the State's
people the power to initiate legislation and to reject or approve by referendum any Act passed by the legislature."'' 08 Because "the California
Constitution ...reserved to the State's people the power ...to reject or
approve ... acts of local governmental bodies," the citizens of San Jose
and San Mateo County could use the referendum process.' 0 9
2.

WITHIN THE SCOPE OF MATrERS ASSIGNED TO THE LEGISLATURE

Although the "people can reserve to themselves [the] power" to
approve or reject governmental actions, the power is not without limitations. 10 After all, the "sovereignty of the people is itself subject to
those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and
remain unrepealed."'
One condition imposed by the federal constitution is that the people use the referendum process for matters "within the
scope of the legislative power." ' 12 Because the people created the legislative body, and only the legislative body, with their inherent power, the
people have standing to reserve the power to deal directly with matters
only assigned to the legislature.
With regard to whether the Eastlake referendum was within the
scope of matters assigned to the legislative body, the Court stated that it
was prevented from determining whether the Eastlake charter amend107. 402 U.S. 136, 139 (1971). In essence, the ordinance "required a referendum to approve
de facto economic segregation through low-income housing projections." ROURKE, supra note 2,
at 154. Although this ordinance served the same purpose as the ordinances in Hunter and
Reitman, the Court allowed "zoning ordinances to stand if they turned on economic rather than
racial distinctions." Id.
108. 402 U.S. at 138. In addition, the Court stated that "California's entire history
demonstrates the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public
policy. A referendum provision was included in the first state constitution, Cal. Const. of 1849,
Art. VIII, and referendums have been a commonplace occurrence in the State's active political
life."
Id.at 141.
109. 402 U.S. at 138.
110. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
111. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976); see also Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969); Lucas v.Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37
(1964); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
112. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 673.
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ment was a legislative matter. Because the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that rezoning was a legislative function, the determination of the
state court would be "binding" on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
3
state law.''
Overall, while the Eastlake case represented an instance when the
Court squarely considered the constitutionality of municipal systems
combining zoning and referendum approval, "Eastlake has not served as
a great impetus for the adoption of referendum zoning. '""' Because of
the decision of the Supreme Court to defer to the determination made by
state courts with regard to the second inquiry, "state law has been substantially more influential" in determining the ultimate fate of the referendum process."' The ultimate fate of a referendum decision rests not
on federal constitutional grounds but on how the state court will label
the action that is subject to a referendum. This binding determination
establishes the standard of review a court will apply when a referendum
decision is challenged. If a state court determines that the action subject
to a referendum is legislative, the court will give great deference to the
decision by the people. 1"' After all, a decision by the people through
referendum would be the same as if the legislature had made the decision. In essence, should a state court determine that a referendum is
legislative, the referendum will receive the blessing of the court in
almost every instance."17 By contrast, if a state court determines that
the action subject to a referendum is quasi-judicial/administrative, the
court will insist on the presence of a greater amount of due process
rights."' Should a state court determine that a referendum is quasi-judicial/administrative, the referendum will be the subject of a Grand Inquisition with a significantly greater chance of reversing an adverse
referendum decision.' '9
113. Id. at 674 n.9. It is important to note that the Court, in dicta, stated that the power of
initiative or referendum may be "reserved or conferred with respect to any matter, legislative or
administrative, within the realm of local affairs." Id. (citing 5 EuGrm MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL COR'ORATIONS § 16.54 (3d ed. 1969)). This statement conveys the Court's support of
the referendum, but, as will be discussed, the decision of the state court will ultimately determine

whether the fate of the referendum.
114. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice, 53 U. CIN. L.
REv. 381, 412 (1984).

115. Id.
116. See generally Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (subjecting legislative decisions

to a limited review and allowing them to be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary
abuse of authority).
117. See id. at 388 ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.").
118. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) ("A determination
whether the permissible use of specific use of property should be changed is usually an exercise of
judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.").

119. See id. at 26, 29 (subjecting quasi-judicial/administrative decisions to stricter scrutiny).
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D. A Note About Due Process Rights and Referendums
As already discussed, the "sovereignty of the people is itself subject
to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and
remain unrepealed."' 20 The courts have held that "a congressional delegation of power to a regulatory entity must be accompanied by discernible standards so that the delegatee's action can be measured for its
fidelity to the legislative will. '1 21 Such discernible standards would pre1 22
vent the potential for arbitrariness in the process.
A question relevant to this article and an issue at the heart of the
Eastlake case was whether the submission of a zoning change for
approval by the citizens of a community lacked the standards necessary
to ensure due process.1 23 The Supreme Court addressed two due process
arguments. The first issue it addressed was whether the referendum procedure violated federal due process rights because any substantive result
of a referendum would be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable-that is,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 24 Although the landowner in Eastlake did not challenge
the referendum decision as arbitrary and unreasonable, the Court concluded that a restriction resulting from an adverse referendum decision
would be "open to challenge in state court, where the scope of the state
remedy available to respondent would be determined as a matter of state
law, as well as under Fourteenth Amendment standards."1 25 Because a
referendum decision would not prevent access to the courts and because
state law would provide a remedy for an adverse decision, federal due
process rights were not implicated by an adverse decision.
The second issue the Court addressed was whether the referendum
process, generally, was a standardless delegation of power to a limited
group of property owners and, thus, in violation of the Due Process
Clause.1 26 In Eubank v. Richmond 27 and Washington ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,128 the Supreme Court condemned the
standardless delegation of power to the people at large, but in the
Eastlake case, the Court refused to extend these previous decisions to
120. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392; see also Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-

37 (1964); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
121. Eastlake, 426 U.S. 675 (1976). See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
U.S. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Algonquin, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.C. 1971). See generally 8
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICn'AL CORrORTxIONS § 25.16 (3d ed. rev. 1996).

122. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 675.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 676.

125. Id. at 677.
126. Id. at 679.
127. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
128. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
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the referendum process. 29
A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating
through its voters-an exercise by the voters of their traditional right
through direct legislation to override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public interest.13°
Ultimately, the Eastlake court rejected the argument that zoning
referendums, or for that matter referendums generally, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The referendum procedure, which "demonstrate[s] devotion to democracy,"1 3 1 ensures that "all
the people of a community will have a voice in a decision."1 32 The
referendum process is not fundamentally unfair to landowners because
an adverse referendum decision is open to challenge in state court where
relief mechanisms are available.133
IV.

THE MIAMI BEACH ZONING REFERENDUM, IS IT A
VIABLE OPTION?

With the Supreme Court giving a constitutional seal of approval for
the referendum and explaining how to properly reserve the right to use
the referendum power to meet the federal constitutional requirements, it
is now possible to address whether the citizens of Miami Beach have
reserved the right to implement a zoning referendum.
A.

1.

Reservation in Constitution

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF RESERVATION IN THE
STATE CONSTITUTION

To satisfy the federal constitutional requirements, the citizens of
Florida must reserve the referendum procedure in the state constitution
in order to exercise the referendum mechanism.1 34 While Florida's history does not demonstrate "the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public policy" like California, 135 this did
129. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 679.

130. See id. at 668 (citation omitted).
131. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).

132. Id. at 143.
133. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 679 n.13 (1976). In addition to challenging any action under the
Euclid "fairly debatable standard," there is administrative relief in hardship cases. Id. The Court
noted that "the very purpose of 'variances' allowed by zoning officials is to avoid 'practical
difficulties and unnecessary hardship."' Id. (citing 8 EurENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.16 (3d ed. rev. 1996)).
134. See James, 402 U.S. 137; see also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976).

135. James, 402 U.S. at 141.
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not preclude the Florida Supreme Court, in FloridaLand Co. v. City of
Winter Springs, 36 from unequivocally finding that the citizens of Florida reserved the right to use the referendum in the state constitution.
The court found that as far back as 1885, the Florida Constitution envisioned the use of the referendum. While the 1885 constitution allowed
the referendum for select situations, such as being part of the procedure
necessary to issue bonds or finalize the passage of special or local
laws, 137 the people reserved the right to use the referendum procedure in
a more general fashion in the 1968 state constitution. The citizens of
Florida, in adopting the 1968 constitution, "reserved certain powers to
themselves, choosing to deal directly with some governmental measures.
The referendum, then, is the essence of a reserved power."' 3 8 Overall, a
reading of the relevant sections of the constitution made it "abundantly
clear" to the court that the citizens of Florida reserved the referendum
1 39
power as a means of approving or rejecting legislation.
2.

RESERVATION IN THE MIAMI BEACH CHARTER

The Florida Supreme Court stated that "[o]nce the referendum
power is reserved, particularly as done in [Florida's] current constitution, this power can be exercised wherever the people through their legislative bodies decide that it should be used." 4 ° Because of the general
nature of the language in the Florida Constitution, a reservation in the
charter of the local governing body is a necessity."'4 Thus, the citizens
of Miami Beach must have properly reserved the referendum procedure
14 2
under their city charter to pass federal constitutional scrutiny.
136. 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983).
137. See id.at 172 n.4.
138. Id.at 172.
139. Id. "ARTICLE I. SECTION 1. Political power. - All political power is inherent in the
people. The enunciation herein of certain property rights shall not be construed to deny or impair
others retained by the people." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1968).
"ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5. General and special elections. - Special elections and
referenda shall be held as provided by law." FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1968).
140. Florida Land, 427 So. 2d at 172-73.
141. See Holzendorf v. Bell, 606 So. 2d 645, 648-49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("Unless some
provision of the [city] charter grants to the electorate the right of referendum.., the electorate has
no authority" to subject the a city council's actions to a referendum.).
142. See, e.g., Florida Land, 427 So. 2d at 173 (finding submission of a City of Winter Springs
ordinance effecting a change in zoning for a specific parcel of land to a referendum vote
constitutional because the charter of Winter Springs provided that qualified voters had the power
to require an ordinance to be submitted to the citizens for the "purpose of commencing
referendum proceedings"); City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1972)
(The "right to [a] referendum [was] provided for duly" by the city charter of Coral Gables,
Florida.); Scott v. City of Orlando, 173 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) (finding that citizens
properly reserved the initiative and referendum power because the city charter provided that any
ordinance "may be submitted to the council by a petition" for a council vote or may "be submitted
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The "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment is a clear statement
by the citizens of Miami Beach that they are reserving the referendum
power. The language of the "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment-"requiring voter approval prior to [any] floor area ratio increase
of waterfront-adjacent property"-would unquestionably satisfy federal
or state constitutional scrutiny.' 43 However, the real issue is whether the
citizens of Miami Beach properly, or even had the right in the first place,
to alter the city charter to include this type of zoning amendment.
Section 51 of the Miami Beach Charter specifically outlines the
procedure for altering and amending the city charter. According to this
section, whenever citizens submit petitions proposing amendments to
the city charter, "the city commission shall without delay give the electors the right to vote on such amendments."'" While the voters have the
right to vote on amendments to the charter, § 51 imposes two limitations. First, a vote by the electors on any amendment or alteration must
be in accordance with § 5.03 of the Metropolitan Home Rule Charter of
Miami-Dade County.145 Second, any amendment or alteration of the city
charter must be in accordance with chapter 166 of the Florida
46
Statutes. 1
The incorporation of § 5.03 and chapter 166 demonstrates that the
original drafters of the Miami Beach charter envisioned the citizens of
Miami Beach using the referendum as a mechanism for altering or
amending the city charter because both provisions discuss what conditions are necessary to properly submit an amendment or alteration of a
city charter to the voters. Section 5.03 provides that only "after [the
adoption of] a resolution or after the certification of a petition of ten (10)
percent of the qualified electors of the municipality" may a proposal be
submitted to the electors of a municipality to determine whether to
adopt, amend, or revoke a city charter. 147 Chapter 166, in particular
to the qualified voters of the city"); Merrill v. Dade County, 272 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
(finding that citizens of Miami-Dade County properly reserved the right to use initiatives and
referendums in the Miami-Dade County Code).
143. MIAi BEACH, FLA., RES. 97-22413 (June 4, 1997). See note 148 listing cases where
Florida courts deemed language similar to that found in the "Save Miami Beach" Charter

Amendment as a proper reservation of the referendum power.
144. MLAMI BEACH, FLA., CHARTER § 51, Alteration and amendment of Charter (1964)
(emphasis added).
145. MiAmI-DADE

COUNTY,

FLA., HOME RULE CHARTER § 5.03, Municipal charters (1993).

During the writing of this article, the name of Dade County was changed to Miami-Dade County.
Thus, there may be situations, such as in older cases or in older ordinances, where Miami-Dade
County is referred to as Dade County.
146. The city charter actually provides that the charter may be altered or amended in
accordance with chapter 6940 of the Laws of Florida; however, this chapter subsequently was

replaced with chapter 166, Florida Statutes (1999).
147. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., HOME RULE

CHARTER

§ 5.03 (1993).
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§ 166.03 1(1), maintains that the governing body of a municipality may,
by ordinance or by petition signed by ten percent of the registered electors, "submit to the electors of said municipality a proposed amendment
to its charter, which amendment may be to any part or to all of said
charter except that part describing the boundaries of such
' 148
municipality."
Section 26 of the Miami Beach Charter further supports the notion
that the original drafters of the Miami Beach charter envisioned the citizens of Miami Beach using the referendum. This section provides that
"referendum petitions shall be forwarded ... for completion of a certificate as to the petition's sufficiency."' 49 Overall, these sections expressly

provide how and when a proposed amendment or alteration of the city
15
charter is submitted to the voters. 1
An argument could be raised that the citizens of Miami Beach may
not use the referendum process because the city charter specifically
withholds the referendum power with regard to zoning functions. Sections 28 through 39 collectively form Article VI, the Zoning Enabling
Act, of the Miami Beach Charter. In particular, § 32 of the Zoning
Enabling Act provides that "no such amendment, supplement, change,
modification or repeal" regarding zoning, "shall become effective except
by the favorable vote of five-sevenths of all of the members of the city
commission after notice and public hearing."'' Moreover, § 37 provides that if "the provisions of this Act shall conflict with any powers or
limitations contained in the Charter of said City of Miami Beach, Florida, then such provisions of said Charter shall remain in force except as
' 52
so far as they may be destructive of the provisions of this Act."'
Because §§ 51 and 26 generally allow Miami Beach citizens to amend
the city charter through the referendum, these sections may be used to
potentially destroy the Zoning Enabling Act. The "Save Miami Beach"
Charter Amendment, which employed §§ 51 and 26, would destroy § 32
because it would not only limit but completely supplant the power of the
city commission to amend, supplement, change, modify, or repeal any
148. FLA. STAT. § 166.031(1) (1999).
149. MiAMi BEACH, FLA., CHARTER § 26, Codification of ordinances; passage of ordinances by
petition of electorate; procedure for filing petitions (1964) (emphasis added).
150. See generally Scott v. City of Orlando, 173 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) (finding
that citizens properly reserved the initiative and referendum power because the city charter

provided that any proposed ordinance "shall be submitted to the qualified voters of [the] city").
The language in the Orlando City Charter, which the court found as a proper reservation of the
referendum procedure, is similar to the language found in the Miami Beach Charter providing that
after certificate, "the city commission... must ... submit the [measure] to its electorate." MiAmI
BEACH, FLA., CHARTER § 26.
151. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CHARTER § 32, Method of amending, etc., regulations, etc. (1964).
152. MiAMi BEACH, FLA., CHARTER § 37 (1964).
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zoning regulation or restriction with the voters. To prevent this limitation in power, § 37 would function to nullify the "Save Miami Beach"
Charter Amendment thus leaving § 32 and the power of the commission
intact.
While §§ 32 and 37 appear to nullify the "Save Miami Beach"
Charter Amendment, in 1989, Miami Beach repealed the Zoning
Enabling Act and replaced it with Ordinance 89-2665, the Zoning Ordinance of Miami Beach, Florida. In adopting the Zoning Ordinance, the
citizens delegated their inherent powers and the ability to use the referendum to the City Commission in the interest of "conserving the value
of Buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land" throughout Miami Beach.' 5 3 The Zoning Ordinance evidences this delegation
of power because, like its predecessor, the City Commission must
approve any amendment or change of the Zoning Ordinance.' 54 For the
"Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment to be valid, it must have been

approved by the City Commission.
Ultimately, it appears that the citizens of Miami Beach properly
amended the Zoning Ordinance. As part of the requirement to amend
the Zoning Ordinance, "Save Miami Beach" petitioned the Miami Beach
City Commission to submit the "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment to the electors. Qualifying as a petition under § 14-1(B),155 the
petition was read by title or in full on at least two separate days and, at
least ten days prior to adoption, it was noticed in a newspaper of general
circulation. 156 Following a public hearing at the second reading, the
City Commission voted to adopt the petition. 157 The City Commission
153. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE 89-2665 § 2, Declaration of purpose (1989).
154. See MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE 89-2665 § 14-3(C) (1989) ("An affirmative vote of

5/7ths of all members of the City Commission shall be necessary in order to enact any amendment
to this Ordinance."). Section 14 outlines the procedures for changes and amendments to the
Zoning Ordinance. Section 14-1 outlines the petition for changes and amendments. With regard
to this article, § 14-1 outlines the petition for changes and amendments. Section 14-3 outlines the
action the City Commission should take with regard to petitions filed under § 14-1.
155. MIAMI BEACH,

FLA., ORDINANCE

89-2665

§ 14-1(B),

Petition for changes and

amendments (1989) ("A request to amend the Zoning Ordinance or Comprehensive Plan which
does not rezone private parcels or real property or substantially change permitted Use categories
may be submitted.").
156. See Miami Beach, City Attorney Letter to Commission Initiative Petition Mandating
Public Vote for Increase in Waterfront Floor Area Ratio-Referendum of Zoning-Related Issues
(Mar. 5, 1997) (Public hearing held and motion made directing the City Attorney to prepare a
resolution placing the petition initiative on the ballot.); see also MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE
89-2665 § 14-3(B), Action by City Commission (1989).
157. See Miami Beach, City Attorney Commission Memorandum No. 237-97 (April 2, 1997)
(approving resolution calling for a special election to be held on June 3, 1997, for the purpose of
submitting to the electorate of Miami Beach an Amendment to the Miami Beach City Charter

requiring voter approval prior to an increase in the floor area ratio of property adjacent to the
waterfront).
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adopted a resolution forwarding the referendum petition to the MiamiDade County Elections Department for completion of a certificate as to
the sufficiency of the petition."5 8 After a special election159 in which the
voters overwhelmingly approved of the amendment, the City Commission followed procedure and had the election results certified. 6 '
By adhering to the protocol outlined in § 26 of the Miami Beach
Charter, § 5.03 of the Miami-Dade County Code, chapter 166 of the
Florida Statutes, and, most importantly, § 14-3 of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance, the "Save Miami Beach" group successfully amended the
Zoning Ordinance to allow the citizens of Miami Beach the right to
approve zoning changes through referendum.
B.

Legislative or Not Legislative, That is the Question

The fate of the "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment ultimately rests on whether increasing the floor area ratio of waterfrontadjacent property is a legislative action or a quasi-judicial action. If a
court deems this action to be within the scope of the legislative power, a
Florida court will more than likely uphold the right of the people to
reserve this power to themselves because a legislative action will be sustained as long as it is fairly debatable.' 61 If a court deems this action to
be quasi-judicial, a Florida court will more than likely overrule or seriously scrutinize the right of the people to exercise the referendum power
in this instance because quasi-judicial actions require the local governing body to "make findings of fact and record of its proceedings,
sufficient for judicial review" to determine "the legal sufficiency of the
findings of fact supporting the reasons given and the legal adequacy,
under applicable law." 16' 2 The ultimate fate of the "Save Miami Beach"

Charter Amendment rests on this determination because a referendum,
158. See MIAMI BEACH, FLA., RES. 97-22346 (April 2, 1997); see also MtAMI BEACH, FLA.,
§ 26 (1964) ("Initiative or referendum petitions shall be forwarded... for completion of
a certificate as to the petition's sufficiency."); MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., HOME RULE CHARTER
§ 5.03 (1993) ("After adopting a resolution or after the certification of a petition of ten (10)
percent of the qualified electors of the municipality," the proposed charter amendment "shall be
CHARTER

submitted to the electors ...

at a special election.").

159. A special election was necessary because no election was scheduled within sixty to 120
days after the drafting of the proposed charter amendment. See MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA.,

§ 5.03 (1993).
160. See MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CHARTER § 26 (1964); see also MIAMI BEACH, FLA., RES. 9722413 (JUNE 4, 1997).
161. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 673; see also Nance v. Town of Indialantic, 419 So. 2d 1041
HOME RULE CHARTER

(Fla. 1982); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941); Hirt v. Polk

County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 578 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
162. Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 471 (Fla. 1993).
See generally DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957) (stating that rulings of a board
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity will be upheld only if they are supported by substantial

competent evidence).
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by its very nature, is an action taken without any findings being made or
any reason being given for supporting the decision, and only a legislative body has the discretion to undertake163an action without any findings
or any reasons supporting the decision.

Florida always has considered the enactment of original zoning
ordinances a legislative function. 64 Moreover, rezoning, whether it
involved a specific individual property or the amendment of an official

land use map, also acquired legislative
zoning map or comprehensive
1 65
courts.
the
by
classification
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was an increasing need for
reforming local zoning decision making. The lack of cooperation
between municipal, county, and state governments began to impact the
physical, social, environmental, and fiscal development of the state. In
response, Florida enacted legislation 1 6 requiring that counties and

municipalities adopt a local plan that would include "principles, guidelines, and standards for the orderly and balanced future . . . develop-

ment" of the local government's jurisdictional area. 167 No longer would
decisions be made on an "ad hoc, sloppy and self-serving" basis. 1 68 Pursuant to § 166.3171, the future land use plan had to be based on ade-

quate data and analysis concerning the local jurisdiction, and each
development approved by the local government had to be consistent
16 9
with the adopted local plan.
The enactment of § 166.3171 led some district courts to reconsider
whether rezoning was still a purely legislative function.1 70 By requiring

that each governmental zoning decision be consistent with the goals,
policies, and measurable objectives incorporated in the future land use
163. See Snyder v. Board of County Comm's, 595 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
164. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474; see also Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926);
Gulf & E. Dev. Corp. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 354 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1978); County of Pasco v. J.
Dico, Inc., 343 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
165. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474; see also Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427
So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983) (holding that a rezoning application, which described an amendment to the
city's official zoning map and comprehensive land use map, was legislative); Palm Beach County
v. Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (holding that a board's action on a
specific rezoning application of an individual property owner was legislative); City of
Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (same).
166. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-163.3215, Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act (1995).
167. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(1) (1991).
168. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionalityin
Land-Use Law, 24 URn. LAW 1, 2 (1992).
169. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(6)(a) (1995).
170. See, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Snyder v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Palm Beach County v. Tinnerman, 517 So.
2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984).
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map and including established standards to be utilized to control and
distribute densities and intensities of development in an effort to promote balanced and orderly growth,17 ' it appeared that § 166.3171 conferred some modicum of due process protection to those seeking a local
zoning decision.
With § 166.3171 beginning to impact district court decisions, the
Florida Supreme Court, in 1993, granted certiorari to reconsider the legislative/quasi-judicial distinction with regard to rezoning actions.172 In
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, the
appellees, Jack and Gall Snyder, filed an application to rezone their
property, which the board of county commissions denied without stating
a reason.' 7 3 Brevard County argued that case law supports the proposition that rezoning decisions are legislative, and thus, it was within the
discretion of the board to decide whether to make findings of fact or to
provide a reason for denial.' 74 The Snyders argued that "the rationale
for the early decisions that rezonings are legislative in nature ha[d]
changed" by the enactment of § 166.3171.175 To ensure that local governments followed the principles enunciated in their comprehensive
plans, the Snyders maintained that it was necessary for the courts to
impose a stricter scrutiny than would be provided under the fairly debatable rule, which would require the Brevard County Board of Commissioners to support its zoning decision with findings.' 76
While the supreme court still recognized enactments of original
zoning ordinances as legislative, the court moved away from the position that if "the original act [was] wholly legislative, an amendment to it
part[ook] of the same character."' 7 7 On the contrary, the court found
171. See

FLA. STAT.

§ 163.3177(6)(a) (1995).

172. See Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).

173. See id. The Snyders owned a one-half acre parcel of property zoned GU (general use).
See id. at 471. Rather than constructing a single-family residence, the Snyders filed an application

to rezone their property to RU-2-15, which allows the construction of fifteen units per acre. See
id. After initially denying the application because the property was located in a one-hundred-year
flood plain, which permitted a maximum of two units per acre reviewing the application, the
Brevard County Planning and Zoning staff voted to approve the rezoning request because
development of the property would raised to the point where the flood plain restriction would no

longer be applicable. See id. Upon presentation to the board of county commissions, the
commission denied the rezoning request without stating a reason. See id.
174. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 472 (quoting Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337 (Fla.
3d DCA 1991)).
175. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 472.

176. See id.
177. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (stating that the court
"would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as
legislative acts to be accorded full presumption of validity and shielded from less than
constitutional scrutiny by the separation of powers"); cf. City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256
So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1972) (holding that "the enactment of the original zoning ordinance was a
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that "the character of the hearing" determines whether a board's action
is legislative or quasi-judicial. 78 Legislative action at a hearing results
in the formulation of a general rule of policy, whereas judicial action at a
179
hearing results in the application of a general rule of policy.
In applying this principle, the court found that comprehensive
rezonings affecting a large portion of the public are legislative in
nature. 180 In contrast, rezoning actions will be categorized as quasi-judicial, non-legislative, if three elements are present. First, the rezoning
action has an affect on a limited number of property owners.' 8 1 Second,
a rezoning action is quasi-judicial if the outcome is contingent on a fact
or facts presented at a hearing.1 82 Third, the rezoning action can be
functionally viewed as the application of a policy rather than the setting
183
of a policy.
Based on this new standard, the court found that the action taken on
the Snyder's application was quasi-judicial. 84 First, the rezoning of the
Snyder's property affected a finite number of people. 185 Second, the
outcome of the Snyder's rezoning application was contingent upon several facts, which came out during two public hearings. These facts
included the recommendation of the county planning department, the
opinions of local residents, and the overall impact of the development on
the infrastructure.' 86 Third, the denial of the rezoning request involved
applying the request to the standards set forth in the county's compre187
hensive plan.
Because the action taken on the Snyder's rezoning application was
legislative function and we cannot reason that the amendment of it was of different character.");
Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1959).
178. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474.
179. See id.
A judicial or quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable, and the rights
affected by them, in relation to past transactions. On the other hand, a quasilegislative or administrative order prescribes what the rule or requirement of
administratively determined duty shall be with respect to transactions to be executed
in the future, in order that same shall be considered lawful. But even so, quasilegislative and quasi-executive orders, after they have already been entered, may
have a quasi-judicial attribute if capable of being arrived at and provided by law to
be declared by the administrative agency only after express statutory notice, hearing
and consideration of evidence to be adduced as a basis for the marking thereof.
Id. (quoting West Flagler Amusement Co. v. State Racing Comm'n, 165 So. 64, 65 (Fla. 1935)).
180. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474.
181. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (quoting Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard
County, 595 So. 2d 65, 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474.
185. See Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 69-70.
186. See id.
187. See id.
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quasi-judicial, the review of the action was subject to strict scrutiny.188
In order to uphold a board's action, the court required that there be a
showing of "competent substantial evidence" supporting the board's
decision.18 9 Because of the board's lack of findings and failure to provide a reason for denying the petition, the court ordered that the county
allow the Snyders to refile their petition without prejudice. 190
Following the Snyder decision, the appellate courts of Florida had a
chance to ponder the new standard of how to determine whether a land
use decision is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature.191 In Section 28
Partnership,Ltd. v. Martin County, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
mulled over the third prong of the Snyder court analysis, which is examining whether the action complained of resulted in the formulation of a
general rule of policy or in the application of a rule. 19 2 In employing
this factor, the court respected the Snyder court's declaration that a court
should consider whether the proposed zoning was consistent with the
existing plan should be a significant factor.193 Applying this rationale,

the court found that Section 28's application would not be consistent
with the existing county comprehensive plan. In fact, Section 28's
request for an ACUSA designation would require the amendment of the
county comprehensive plan to provide for this zoning category.1 94 Thus,
because "an ACUSA would be a new classification of property which
[was] not presently in the comprehensive plan," the court found that the
county's decision was "a 'formulation of a general rule of policy."""
The county's decision "would not be the application of policy because
there [were] no provisions under the existing plan for the creation of
ACUSAs."' 196
188. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474-75. The court was careful in emphasizing that review by
strict scrutiny in land use decisions is different from the type of strict scrutiny review afforded in
constitutional cases. The term strict scrutiny arises from the necessity of strict compliance with
the comprehensive plan. See Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, Ltd. Partnerships, 619 So. 2d 996
(Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
189. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
190. Id.

191. Because they are beyond the scope of this article, there will be no discussion regarding
decisions of local government on building permits, site plans, and other development orders. The

Florida Supreme Court has determined that these actions are quasi-judicial and therefore subject to
certiorari review by the courts because no legislative discretion is involved in determining whether
a property owner complied with the regulations set out in applicable local ordinance. See Park of
Commerce Assocs. v. City of Delray Beach, 636 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1994).
192. 642 So. 2d 609, 612 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1994).

193. Id. at 612.
194. See id. ACUSA stands for "Adjacent County Urban Service Area."
195. Id.; see also City Envtl. Servs. Landfill, Inc. v. Holmes County, 677 So. 2d 1327, 1328-29
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (finding that amending the Future Land Use Map to include the new category
of "Landfill" would be a formulation of a general rule of policy).
196. Id.

1999]

RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL

569

Section 28 maintained that the ACUSA request was a site specific,
owner-initiated rezoning request, which was policy application, not policy making. 197 The court rejected this argument because "the fact that
[the development was] site specific, however, [was] not necessarily
determinative of the issue."19' 8 What was determinative was whether the
comprehensive rezoning affected a large portion of the public. 199 Considering the pristine nature of the land in the park and around the river,
the size of the park, and the use of it by the public, the court held that the
changes sought here involved matters of policy, subject to review under
the fairly debatable standard. 2°
In Board of County Commissioners of SarasotaCounty v. Karp, the
Second District Court of Appeal had a chance to address whether the
"character of the hearing" standard referred to the due process aspects of
the hearing and in doing so, the court rejected this notion. 2° 1 The Snyder
criteria did not refer to the due process aspects of the hearing to determine whether an action was legislative or quasi-judicial. °2 Rather, a
court was to apply the criteria to determine whether a county's action
was a formulation of a general policy or the application of a previously
determined policy. 203 Applying this rationale, the court found that the
development plan, affecting some 179 acres of land, including fortyeight separate parcels, was the formulation of a general policy rather
than the application of a previously determined policy. 2° Moreover,
although the corridor plan directly affected a finite number of parcels,
the number was fairly substantial.20 5
In Kahana v. City of Tampa, the court quashed the decision of the
trial court, which misconstrued the test in Snyder.2 °6 In this case, an

owner of a parcel zoned YC-1 filed a petition to rezone the parcel to
allow for the sale of alcohol.20 7 Under the comprehensive zoning plan,
such a rezoning did not change the YC- 1 central commercial core status.
Instead, it added a wetzone designation to the property's classification.20 8 The Second District Court of Appeal stated that the rezoning of
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469,
474 (Fla. 1993)).
200. Id. at 612.
201. 662 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
202. See id. at 720.
203. See id.
204. Id. The property owner, in this case, requested that his property be designated as
commercial parkway rather than office. See id. at 718.
205. See id.
206. 683 So. 2d 618, 619-20 (Fla.2d DCA 1996).
207. See id. at 619.
208. See id.
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a single parcel was not legislative simply because the neighborhood in
question was densely populated with residents who were up in arms
about the proposed land use change. 209 The test was whether the city
council's decision on the petition formulated a "general rule of policy"
and, thus, affected many people, or whether it merely applied an existing
general rule of policy to a specific parcel.21° The record was unclear
whether the city formulated any general rule of policy in denying the
wetzoning petition.2 ' In remanding the action, the court did state that
this action appeared to be similar in nature to the denial of a site plan,
which is quasi-judicial.21 2
In Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc.,23 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal had a chance to apply the Snyder criteria. In this case,
Leisure Hills proposed the development of a subdivision." 4 After
receiving conditional plat approval and spending nearly $500,000 to
develop the subdivision in accordance with its approved plans and specifications, the Hernando County Commission rejected the plat. 215 The
court stated that although the record indicated the county commission
was looking for a way to deny the plat based on rising community resistance, the overall action taken by the commission was legislative. 216 The
county commission "did not merely apply existing policy to a particular
property; it changed its policy in order to disqualify the subject property
and all other similar property from plat approval in the future. 21 7
Because the commission did not apply an existing policy but in fact
changed and created a new policy in order to disqualify the plat, the
action by the commission qualified as a legislative action.
Finally, in Martin County v. Yusem,2" 8 the supreme court had a

chance to revisit the Snyder decision. In Yusem, the court concluded that
"amendments to comprehensive land use plans are legislative decisions. 219 Moreover, the court noted that this conclusion was "not
affected by the fact that the amendments to comprehensive land use
plans are being sought as part of a rezoning application in respect to one
209. Id. at 620. The court also found the opposite to be true. The rezoning of a single parcel
was not quasi-judicial merely because the neighborhood was sparsely populated or its residents

unconcerned. See id. at 619-20.
210. Id. at 620.
211. See id.
212. Id. See generally Park of Commerce Assocs. v. City of Delray Beach, 636 So. 2d 12 (Fla.

1994).
213. 689 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
214. See id.
215. See id.

216. Id. at 1104.
217. Id.
218. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).

219. Id. at 1293.
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piece of property. '220 The court found that it could dispense with Snyder's functional analysis in rezoning cases because amending a comprehensive plan resulted in policy reformulation. 22' Furthermore,
amendments to comprehensive plans are legislative decisions because an
amendment of the comprehensive plan is evaluated on several levels of
government to ensure consistency with the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act.222
On its face, it would appear that the "Save Miami Beach" Charter
Amendment would not survive Snyder and its progeny. To survive judicial scrutiny, only legislative actions could be subject to the charter
amendment's referendum requirement. However, Snyder and its progeny appear to classify fewer rezoning actions as legislative. The progeny of Snyder have, in the last five years, limited the legislative
qualification to rezoning actions that affect the public at large or amend
the comprehensive plan.2 23

With regard to which rezoning actions affect the public at large,
one could argue that the "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment
applies only rezoning actions that affect the public, and not a finite
number of people. One could argue that Miami Beach, as a whole, is
similarly situated as the property discussed in the Section 28 case. In
Section 28, the property in question was bordered on two sides by a state
park and a preserve area.224 Considering the pristine nature of these
lands, the size of the park, and the use of the park by the public, the
court there found that any resulting rezoning involved matters of policy,
subject to review under the fairly debatable standard. 25 Here, the city is
located on a seven-mile barrier island.226 Furthermore, not only is
Miami Beach located in a designated 100 year floodplain, but a great
deal of the city is classified as a high hazard area in the floodplain.227
Moreover, the tidal surge that occurs when hurricanes approach the
South Florida coast is such a danger that all of Miami Beach is a
mandatory evacuation zone. Thus, any development would have an
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1293-94.

222. See id. at 1294.
223. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474; accord Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1292
(Fla. 1997); Battaglia Properties, Ltd. v. Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 629 So. 2d
161, 164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, Ltd. Partnerships, 619 So. 2d
996, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The Yusem court equated amending the comprehensive plan with
formulating, or more appropriately, reformulating general policy. 690 So. 2d at 1293.
224. See 642 So. 2d at 612.

225. Id.
226. See MIAMI
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impact on the city's population because it would increase the densities
and intensities of development on the island. Uncontrolled growth on
the island would increase the amount of traffic and thus hamper the
facilitation of a hurricane evacuation. As a pristine area, any increase in
the floor area ratio of waterfront-adjacent property would decrease
access to light, air, and views, decrease or restrain public access to the
beaches, and tax the city's delicate infrastructure and environment.
Thus, any decision to increase the floor area ratio of a waterfront-adjacent property would amount to a legislative action subject to a
22
referendum. 1
With regard to which rezoning actions affect the public at large, it
appears that the Florida Legislature has gotten involved and may have
ultimately preempted the "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment.
While the Snyder progeny detail a growing battle between the district
courts over whether size matters, the Legislature has located where the
line will be drawn. The Legislature determined that the referendum or
initiative process is prohibited "in regard to any development order or in
regard to any local comprehensive plan amendment or map amendment
that affects five or fewer parcels of land."2'29
The question remains as to whether the Legislature has the right to
make this determination. Is this law a violation of due process or equal
protection? Is this law a violation of separation of powers? Is this law
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in the
Eastlake case that the people may reserve the power to use the referendum process 23° and with the Florida Supreme Court's holding in the
Florida Land Co. case that the referendum power was reserved by the
people in the state constitution and "can be exercised wherever the peo'231
ple through their legislative bodies decide that it should be used.
One could argue that the Legislature is free to determine when the referendum process can be employed because the Florida Constitution provides that "referendum shall be held as provided by law. 2 32 Because
the courts repeatedly have concluded that zoning is subject matter within
a legislature's powers and because zoning laws will be valid as long as
there is a rational basis, 2 33 it would appear that the Florida Legislature
may withhold the referendum process under § 163.3167(12) in the interest of the public safety, health, and welfare.
228. See

MIAMI BEACH, FLA., YEAR

ANALYSIS 1-2 (1996).
229. FLA. STAT. §

2000

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, PART I: DATA AND

163.3167(12) (1998).
230. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976).
231. Florida Land Co v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 172-73 (Fla. 1983).
232. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1968).
233. See Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926).
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With regard to qualifying as a legislative action because the rezoning action seeks to amend the comprehensive plan, the "Save Miami
Beach" Charter Amendment faces the problem of § 163.3167(12) and
the problem that the Miami Beach Comprehensive Plan contains nearly
every imaginable zoning classification. 23 4 Even if a court should strike
down § 163.3167, a party seeking to rezone their waterfront-adjacent
property would likely find some envisioned land use classification without the need to request an amendment of the comprehensive plan. Thus,
rather than formulating a general rule with regard to some new zoning
classification, a court would find that the denial of a rezoning application would be quasi-judicial and reviewable by certiorari. This is
because the referendum vote was an application of a general rule to a
specific individual or interest.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision to let the states decide
whether a land use action is legislative or quasi-judicial could signify the
demise of the referendum procedure. Although the Supreme Court has
maintained that the referendum procedure is "a basic instrument of democratic government," state court decisions finding rezoning actions to be
quasi-judicial could undermine the long-term life of the referendum.2 3 5
Because a referendum, by its very nature, is an action taken without any
findings of fact being made or any reasons given for the result, a referendum always would fail to meet the requirement of competent substantial
evidence necessary to meet the strict scrutiny standard of certiorari
review. The "Save Miami Beach" Charter Amendment could become
the first of many failed attempts by concerned citizens to regain control
over their own growth and prosperity by the referendum process.
At one time, the Supreme Court believed it had the authority to
declare its opinion on the standard of review to be applied to zoning
decisions.2 3 6 Unless the Supreme Court returns to the attitude established in the Euclid case, that the Court does have the authority to
declare its opinion on the standard of review to be applied to zoning
decisions, the most democratic of processes, the referendum, could be in
danger of becoming extinct.
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subject to limited review and may be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse
of authority).

